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ABSTRACT
The natural space radiation environment can be considered harsh for semiconductor electronics that make up
SmallSat instruments and systems. Radiation effects impact Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE)
device performance in multiple ways: semiconductor material degradation and charge creation within the
device. SmallSats usually achieve their goals by utilizing commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components, which
can be considered more susceptible to radiation effects than high reliability components which have higher piece
part costs. The impacts can accrue over the mission life or have instantaneous repercussions, thus, they are
highly dependent on the mission environment. Unique mission launch date (period within the solar cycle),
duration, and destination (orbit) determine the resultant radiation hazard. SmallSats are seeking a way to plan
for operation in environments beyond low inclination, Low Earth Orbit (LEO), and short lifetime. In order to
succeed with budget and schedule limitations experienced on the SmallSat paradigm, they will need to adopt
practices of radiation hardness assurance (RHA). Radiation requirements and testing need to be tailored such
that they do not impose overburden.
INTRODUCTION
System-level radiation requirements can drive test
and assurance methodologies for microelectronic and
photonic devices that must operate in the natural
space environment, engendering trade-offs involving
part selection, schedule, cost, and risk. While this is
true for many environmental factors (e.g. thermal
effects, operation in a vacuum, etc.), radiation threats
are largely unique to space environments. The
radiation response of each semiconductor is derived
from the interaction between the device materials,
process, design, and architecture; therefore, radiation
testing has played a crucial role in revealing and
characterizing vulnerabilities in systems with a family
tree’s worth of failure modes. For SmallSats, with
their reliance on a broad range of COTS devices, low
cost, and schedule constraints; testing every part -- or
even every critical part -- is not an option.

This paper describes how radiation threats change in
different radiation environments, how mission
requirements become radiation requirements, and it
considers how these changes affect requirements and
the tradeoffs faced by system and subsystem
designers. Similarity data (and its limitations) are
discussed so that caveats and short-comings are
understood.
RHA PROCESS OVERVIEW
The RHA process can benefit SmallSat missions that
have varied mission profiles and risk postures. It is
not the process that needs to be altered, but the
activities associated with the process that can be
tailored to each mission to defray costs.

When SmallSat missions take place in benign
environments, undiscovered radiation threats to
individual parts may pose acceptable risks,
particularly for failure-tolerant missions. However,
now that SmallSats are increasingly deployed in
harsher environments and for more critical missions,
radiation threats need to be taken more seriously, and
fault-tolerance design practices are essential. A key
step toward this goal is the development of a mission
requirements approach that can be tailored to the
Mission Environment, Application and Lifetime
(MEAL). Increased risk tolerance calls for an
approach that considers cost and schedule while
providing assurance against radiation threats, which
facilitates design innovation.
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Figure 1: RHA Process, where color coded boxes
group interdependent activities [1].
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This process is in part necessary because radiation
effects come in two distinct manifestations: Single
Event Effects (SEE) and Mission Dose (both ionizing
and non-ionizing). The environment stipulations and
discussion of how RHA deals with emerging
technologies and COTS components have been
presented by leading agencies and industry
partnerships [1-5]. A top-level outline and grouping
of activities associated with RHA are shown in Figure
1. The three woven boxes can be succinctly described
as:


Defining and evaluating the hazard



Making smart radiation requirements



Analyzing the engineering trades

Each one of these actions can be regarded as an
engineering effort or interaction that enables team
communication of objectives and how to achieve
mission success. The suggested RHA flow can inform
and benefit the selection of EEE parts for an intended
application while weighing the radiation risks to the
system as a whole. The three convolve when
considering the impact of the mission requirements.
This process is then iterated for the system as a whole
when trades are realized, or the environment/design
need changes as a result. The time and money spent
on working on RHA can increase the likelihood of
success by identifying or removing unbound risks to
the system.
Clear mission requirements make it easy to identify
the hazard and determine what constitutes a device or
system failure. Smart mission requirements make it

easy to weigh the hazard vs. response and accept risk
on the basis of categorization. RHA activities beyond
those are focused on buying down the risk with
specific data in mind. The true cost savings to
SmallSat missions is going to come from
requirements that allow the identification and
acceptance of risks.
Define and Evaluate the Radiation Hazard
Orbits and environments are tied to mission
objectives: astronomy, heliophysics, planetary, Earth
science, communications, etc. These objectives also
become drivers for the launch date and mission
duration, both of which contribute to the dynamic
radiation hazard. Typical orbits are referred to as
LEO, Sun Synchronous, Polar, Equatorial, High Earth
Orbit (HEO), Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO),
Heliocentric, etc. Most are tied to the inclination and
altitude of the spacecraft. For the context of this
paper, Figure 2 shows radiation contributors in three
selected orbits and mission durations for missions
with COTS components in mind.
Because each environment is truly unique, there is
risk buy down to be gained in defining the
environment for which the parts of interest are
intended. For instance, short missions may not have a
high total dose over the course of the mission life, but
will still have SEE contributions that interrupt or
threaten the system. Many passes through the Van
Allen radiation belts or the South Atlantic Anomaly
(SAA) can lead to high doses or temporal SEE
threats, while the protection from Earth’s magnetic
field can attenuate the number of Galactic Cosmic
Rays (GCRs) that reach the spacecraft.

Figure 2: Radiation contributions for three general groupings of orbits. These are mapped out for
different mission lengths leading to notional threat levels, which are relative to one another.
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In the figure, manageable dose would seldom cause
parameter shifts in most COTS devices, while
moderate dose may experience degradation but not
functional failures, high dose could pose a threat to
COTS operation. Attenuated GCR refers to the flux
of particles being reduced by Earth’s magnetosphere,
and high GCR would be the flux without that
protection. It can be seen that an increased mission
lifetime changes the hazard from dose (increases the
fluence of particles overall), but not the particle
fluxes that need to be considered for SEE.
Models of the space environment have been built and
are maintained by space agencies/industry, and some
are readily available to the public [5, 6]. The on-orbit
dose and spectra can be estimated to determine a
representative model of what a spacecraft will need to
survive. These types of calculation can be used to
describe the radiation hazard for mission phases or
known operating conditions.

Calculated outputs from these environment models
that convey two top-level radiation threats in a given
environment - the dose-depth curve and the emerging
protons - are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. It is
important to know the species and population of the
particles because they ultimately define the hazards.
These examples have been chosen to highlight the
aforementioned competing threats for EEE parts in a
radiation environment: Dose vs. SEE. These two
plots are not the whole description, but represent how
one can delve into details about the mission
environment and its variations. Total Ionizing Dose
(TID) is accrued over the entire mission life, this can
lead to wear out or aging of certain device parameters
causing threshold shifts and leakage that increases
over time on orbit. Solar events like flares or Coronal
Mass Ejections can eject in the direction of a
spacecraft, where inside the emerging protons
contribute to the SEE event rate. This would be a
worst case prediction, typically used to mimic what
particle populations would be seen during a solar
storm. Nominal SEE rates would be driven by GCR
as a background, with proton contributions from
trapped particles as well as solar wind. These spectra
are available from environment models as well,
though not shown here.
In order to define the hazard:

Figure 3: Dose-depth plot; ionizing dose
contributions are transported through spherical
shielding, the total dose is the summand of all
contributions.

Figure 4: Emerging Protons during a Solar Event;
energetic solar protons are transported through
shielding materials and resultant integral fluxes
are reported. This flux can be used with data on
parts to predict a SEE rate during a Solar Event.
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Segment the mission into phases where the
environment or driving requirements have
unique circumstances (transfer orbits,
science operation, robotic actions, etc.), this
can prove to be useful for conceptually
accepting risks.



Determine
the
contributing
particle
populations to the mission radiation
environment of trapped charged particles,
GCR, solar particles.



Transport the particle fluence and flux
through representative amounts of shielding
materials to determine the environment
where the electronics will be located, this
can done for spherical shells of Al and is
often discussed behind 100mils to first
order.

Once the hazards have been identified and there is a
representative model of what your parts will be
exposed to, the design can be evaluated for outlaid
risks. SmallSats do not want to plan for a costly parts
program with significant margins, so work must be
put in to make smart requirements based on how
devices will react to their new environment. Indeed,
disciplines beyond electrical engineering (i.e.,
Materials, Spacecraft Charging) will benefit from this
type of analysis/activity as well. For “large” missions,
a full environment description document serves as a
reference and one pointer for many disciplines.
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Make Smart Requirements
Acceptance of risk is a part of a validated spacecraft
design. SmallSats by and large have systems and
subsystems on them that are developed to fit a small
form-factor and are readily integrated with other
builds. It would be detrimental to the cost and budget
of the spacecraft to levy requirements on COTS
subsystems that require test and analysis unless
absolutely necessary. Mission requirements should
flow to subsystems that contain the technologies of
interest or that have critical functions where risk
needs to be bounded. Maintaining and managing
requirements is necessary so that communication and
trades happen when beneficial rather than existing as
a method of verification after the fact.

Requiring that all parts survive with large margins
ignores the failure mechanisms for different types of
parts, and can invoke requirements on materials or
subsystems that cannot meet them without analysis or
testing that may not benefit the on-orbit mission risk.
As such, the mission radiation requirements need to
be flowed down to the appropriate technologies.
Establishing the radiation requirements by part family
will allow quick categorization of risk, and lend itself
to a targeted analysis. There are no rules of thumb,
only the physics of failure that can be attributed to
device process and architecture: Here are the known
risks to given technologies [8-11], in a notional order
of risk to the part operation. It is up to the mission
requirements and design to determine the risk to the
intended system operation.

Mission requirements feed into how the hazard is
determined (what orbit, launch date), but also help to
categorize and eliminate risks. Definition of the
failure levels, with respect to radiation, are where the
mission requirements and radiation requirements
overlap heavily. Does mission success rely on one
subsystem or even one spacecraft? This is where
good communication between a team can glean costs
savings on both fronts: analysis resources and the
need for testing. Figure 5 explains how the RHA
needs can be tailored to different hazards. If the
program needs to know the survivability to a
moderate dose and whether or not single event effects
are going to interrupt the availability of a subsystem,
the RHA need would then be high. The higher the
need, the more budget should be put in place for
radiation support, and the higher the likelihood of
requiring specific test data, or needing to test critical
parts in their application.

Figure 5: Environment and mission requirements
can determine the RHA system needs
Radiation requirements (different
overarching mission requirements) need
on a known hazard, but they also need
account the design’s functionality and
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Destructive single event effects (DSEE):
parts can either fail to short or open (family
of effects that permanently damage the
device and result in it being inoperable).



Total Ionizing Dose / Displacement Damage
Dose (TID/DDD): part shows degradation
beyond device specifications, looks like
early wear out mechanisms.



Single Event Transients (SET): Can be rail
to rail voltage or current changes that
damage peripheral components.



Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFI)
that require intervention, depending on part
type may need a reset signal, or a full power
cycle.



Multi-Bit or Cell Upsets (MBU/MCU)
where error detection cannot correct, refresh,
rewrite, or power cycle may be needed.



Single Event Transients (SETs) with error
rates so high that information is lost or
communications need reset.



Single Event Upsets (SEU) can change the
state of memory cells or switch the state of
logic level devices. There are also hard
errors where loss of cell use, masking these
upsets or the blocks or pages that contain
them may keep the remainder of the memory
usable.

Key factors that need to be considered are the
criticality and availability of the EEE part in its
application. In every available opportunity, ask how a
part response will affect the devices that are
connected or share failure modes. Ask what impact
the typical device response would have at the
subsystem or system level. For a discrete transistor,
would a gain degradation lead to science loss? Or
would the device continue to function as a switch?
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Simply stating that if a part failure is a single strain,
and if it is critical, can determine the path to mission
success.
Analyze the engineering trades

intentions and attempts to make statistical use in
order approve of a parts use based on previous
determinations and findings [13, 14]. Below are some
descriptions of radiation responses by device family
and notional impacts:

In evaluating the SmallSat design trades, there are
significant variables and variation from that of larger
mission profiles. If the mission is a secondary
payload, with multiple launch opportunities, would
the radiation hazard be similar? What would that do
to the assumptions of the radiation response? How
would that change the mission phases? Where
criticality and availability are met with unbound
radiation risks, it may be beneficial to test if relevant
data does not exist. Figure 6 weighs the EEE part
criticality vs. the hazard, with some suggested cases
that call for mitigation or testing.

Figure 6: Risk posturing for EEE parts with
critical applications can drive the need to test or
carry a high risk. If the system impact or
upset/degradation is not realized above a
subsystem level, it may be cost beneficial to carry
the risk.
The margins a program or project put to use are and
have been a catchall for uncertainties in many
contributing analyses. When testing cannot be done
on the flight lot or in a flight-like application, margins
need to be applied to account for variability in part
responses, as well as uncertainty in the environment
models.
Radiation testing to buy down risk can be done
sparingly if the requirements on which parts are being
examined for flight are specific, rather than blanket
statements. Radiation threats are unique to a part’s
architecture. The process of the device, the mask set
used, the semiconductor material, and sometimes
even the packaging play a role in the radiation
response on-orbit. These dependencies strain the
applicability of data on similar parts, but as data
accumulates across the community there are
Campola



Power Devices – With high voltage comes
stronger internal electric fields, derating no
“hard off” states can be the most threatening
(where a negative gate voltage is applied for
an NMOS, for instance). MOSFETs can
experience single event gate rupture (SEGR)
or single event burnout (SEB). Thicker
oxides will have greater volume capable of
trapping charge.



Analog Components – some bipolar devices
will be more susceptible to the dose rate in
space vs. the accelerated, ground-based
testing dose rates. Filter SETs on the output
of the device, if possible.



Programmable Logic Devices – responses
are application-based decisions, don’t add
triplication and voter complexities if it will
disrupt the correct operation of your system



Complex Digital Components – responses
are application-based decisions on frequency
and availability



Memories – consider the feature size and
density and expect SEU/MBU. Control logic
will have different responses than the
memory cells and can result in SEFI or
single event latchup (SEL), if not
determined.



RF/Heterojunction devices – faster devices
in terms of charge response, therefore, there
will be fast transients, but the responsivity to
charge will also result in higher SET rates



Opto-electronics – Displacement Damage
and TID can work in concert to degrade
performance like charge transfer ratio
(CTR). Material degradation will impact
efficiency or optical throughput



Mixed Signal – both analog and digital
concerns in one package. Commercial
ADCs/DACs
exhibit
transients
and
functional interrupts, may have digital single
event effects (DSEE) concerns as well



Hybrid Devices – many types of components
packaged together

When it comes to testing, consider system level
impacts to determine the cost benefit of conducting a
test. Always test in a flight-like application and do
5
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or chemical process steps. This is based on trapping
locations within the device like imperfections in the
oxide or interface. Charge traps are what give rise to
parametric shifts in devices and integrated circuits.

Flight
Parts

Mean

not expect results to apply if you are not covering the
same state-space the mission will cover. There are
relevant tests for each failure mechanism, but they
can be considered in the two familiar categories as
mentioned previously, TID/DD and SEE. The two
types of radiation tests indeed have sub-categories
just as the part types and failure modes do. A good
synopsis on the types of testing and how to conduct
them are the topic of a number of short courses and
papers [2-8].
SIMILARITY DATA AND ITS LIMITATIONS

Similar Parts
Historical
Data
Flight
Lot Variability

Using available data, rather than conducting a
radiation test campaign, can be a cost saver.
Radiation facilities are expensive to maintain and the
costs show (cyclotron facility costs can be thousands
per hour). But caution and information need to be
employed when extrapolating previous results to the
mission’s end-use of an EEE part. Many of the
known mechanisms for upsets, failures, or more
generally the response from the device are tied to
specific biases, frequency, operating temperature, etc.
How the testing was conducted needs to envelope or
represent the mission application in order to be valid.

Figure 7: Diagram of relevant data and relation to
flight lot representation [13, 14]

Part-to-part variation in response can be attributed to
the manufacturing process, as can lot-to-lot variation.
If a manufacturer changes foundries or changes the
process to increase performance, large changes in the
radiation response can be seen. These are the drivers
for desiring lot specific test results. SEE testing or
data can benefit from the knowledge that a mask set
and process have not changed (i.e. the sensitive
volumes are similar and the internal transistors are
co-located in the same way), whereas TID results are
much more process oriented with dependencies on
how oxides and interfaces are manufactured and can
vary on small deviations in the temperature, doping,

The figure above shows how close to representative
failure distributions are considered in the realm of
relevant data. As you take into account data on the
flight lot for a critical mission, you can also accept
the risk of part-to-part or lot-to-lot variability on less
critical subsystems. If you are able to justify previous
data for the mission application, what can be
considered useful will inform the decisions of risks to
accept. The guidelines and recommendations of the
minimum data necessary to quantify a risk to the
system can be considered as done in Figure 8. It
should be noted that, in some instances, ruling out
destructive single event effects alone may provide
mission assurance.

All Relevant Data

Figure 8: Radiation Data needs for quantifying risk in the represented missions over varied duration.
Campola
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SUMMARY
Reliability quantification may not always be possible,
but identifying and classifying the radiation risks will
inform radiation requirements and trades that are
most likely to lead to mission success. Taking the
mission environment, device criticality, and
technology into account when establishing radiation
requirements needed to meet mission objectives will
reduce the workload necessary to verify the system
design. Risk identification and traceability to system
responses can alleviate the need to conduct costly
radiation testing. Where unknown risks pose a threat
to mission success, there is no substitute for radiation
testing in the devices’ intended application,
identifying the physics of failure, and avoiding that
mechanism where possible in similar devices or
architectures. Keeping that in mind, when adopting
previous results on commercial electronics and
designing with fault-tolerance in mind, it will lead to
mission success without breaking the bank.
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